We explore how political identity a¤ects trust. Using an incentivized experimental survey conducted on a representative sample of the U.S. population, we vary information about partners'partisan identity to elicit trust behavior, beliefs about trustworthiness, and actual reciprocation. By eliciting beliefs, we are able to assess whether di¤erences in trust rates are due to stereotyping or a "taste for discrimination." By measuring actual trustworthiness, we are able to determine whether beliefs are statistically correct. We …nd that trust is pervasive and depends on the partisan identity of the trustee. Di¤erential trust rates are explained by incorrect stereotypes about the other's lack of trustworthiness rather than by a "taste for discrimination." Given the importance of beliefs, we run additional treatments in which we disclose previous reciprocation rates before participants decide whether to trust. We …nd that beliefs are slightly more optimistic compared with the previous treatments, suggesting that incorrect stereotypes are hard to change.
Introduction
Political polarization of the American public has increased, and partisan antagonism is "deeper and more extensive than at any point in the last two decades" (Pew Research Center, 2014). The consequences of this cross-partisan antipathy manifest themselves in a myriad of ways, both in politics and in everyday life. Evidence suggests that political polarization may be hindering cross-partisan trust, creating political and economic gridlocks (Carlin and In this paper, we explore the e¤ect of partisan identity in trust behavior. We focus on trust, as it is fundamental for economic organization (see, e.g., Arrow 1974; Knack and Keefer 1997) . 1 We are interested in analyzing the mechanism underlying trust. Ferschtman and Gneezy (2001) argue that there are two forces driving it: sentiments that lead to discrimination based on identity ("taste for discrimination") or stereotypes about others' behavior. A taste for discrimination represents individuals'willingness to give away money (i.e., pro…ts, wages, or income) to cater to their prejudice (Becker 1957 (Becker , 1993 ). This prejudice is part of individual preferences and may re ‡ect sentiments of dislike, loathe, anger, or similar emotions towards certain groups. Stereotypes, on the other hand, are simpli…ed perceptions about the behavior of a group of people. These perceptions a¤ect individual behavior through beliefs about others' behavior rather than preferences (Phelps 1972) . Such stereotypes, however, may or may not be statistically correct. 2 The main goal of this paper 1 An interdisciplinary de…nition of trust comes from Rousseau et al. (1998) : "Trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intention or behaviors of others." 2 Williamson (1993) provides a similar view of trust. In his view there are two dimensions to trust: calculative and noncalculative. The former refers to trusting decisions based on calculations is to determine whether monetary trust is driven by preferences or by stereotypes.
We conducted a highly incentivized experimental survey in which we varied the political identity (in terms of partisan identity) and measured a proxy for trust behavior, beliefs about trustworthiness, and actual trustworthiness across a sample of the general U.S. population. The following are the main questions we answer in this paper. 1) Do trust rates vary with political identity of a partner? 2) If so, do these di¤erences in trust depend on beliefs about a partner's trustworthiness or on (social) preferences favoring in-group members relative to out-of-group members? 3) Do beliefs respond to the partisan identity of the partners in the interaction? 4) Are beliefs statistically correct?
In order to address these questions, we base our analysis on a model of identity and social preferences introduced by Chen and Li (2009) , which builds upon Charness and Rabin (2002) and incorporates Akerlof and Kranton's (2000) "prescribed behavior" according to identity.
In our experiment, we run a simpli…ed version of the standard trust game in Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) similar to the one used in Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) . This simpli…ed version is a two-player game in which Player A (the sender) chooses ($5,$5) for himself and the other player, respectively, or defers the decision between ($10,$10) and ($0,$14) to Player B (the receiver). In this game, e¢ ciency would require Player A to defer the decision to Player B. The subgame perfect equilibrium, however, implies Player B choosing ($0,$14). Thus, the potential gains from cooperation are not exploited. This game is labeled "trust game" because Player A choosing to defer the decision to Player B is an indication of her trust in Player B. We used this simpli…ed version because it allowed us to elicit beliefs about trustworthiness directly. In the main treatments, we manipulated the information about the partisan identity of Player A and Player B, and we did not provide any other information regarding the identity of the matched partners. (We also run a baseline treatment in which partisan identity is not revealed.) The outcomes of of expected monetary costs and bene…ts, while the latter refers to decisions based on sentiments and a¤ection. Williamson's calculative trust encompasses stereotypes as beliefs that are fundamental in calculating the expected bene…ts and costs of trust. His noncalculative trust, on the other hand, refers to nonstandard other-regarding concerns.
Player A's and player B's decisions were paid in full. Hence, to the best of our knowledge, this was the …rst highly incentivized experimental survey administered to a sample of the general U.S. population incorporating partisan identity.
We …nd that the Democrat's and Republican's trust rates are around 60%. In answering question 1, we do …nd that trust rates depend on the partisan identity of Player B. Democrats and Republicans trust other Democrats more often, on average. However, only Democrat Player A types have such di¤erent trust levels as to be statistically signi…cant. The answers to questions 2 and 3 are the following: This di¤erence in trust rates is explained by the optimistic beliefs about trustworthiness that Democrats hold in favor of Democrats. Other-regarding preferences, which Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) suggest represent a taste for discrimination, do not seem to be related to trust rates across partisan identity, at least for our game.
Are these beliefs about a partner's trustworthiness statistically correct? Social psychology research (see, e.g., Chambers and Melnyk, 2006) shows that individuals of di¤erent partisan identity hold perceptions of large disagreements with opponents in core values such as abortion, while in reality opinions and actions are more similar than perceived (Mason 2014) . We …nd that, overall, our evidence is consistent with this observation. Regardless of partisan identity, participants engaged in higher rates of reciprocation (i.e., Player B chooses ($10,$10) almost 80% of the time if entrusted with making the decision) than expected (mean of roughly 60%). In addition, Republicans (who are thought to be less trustworthy by both Democrats and Republicans) reciprocate slightly more often than Democrats. Hence, we answer question 4 in the negative: beliefs are not statistically correct.
Given that beliefs drive trust and the fact they were overall more pessimistic than actual reciprocation rates, we ran secondary treatments ("belief treatments") in which we revealed reciprocation rates from the main treatments, before participants decided to trust. These secondary treatments featured the exact same game as in the main treatments where partisan identity was manipulated, except now Player A also received information about the reciprocation rate corresponding to previous Players B. For example, if Player A was a Democrat and Player B a Republican in one of the belief treatments, we disclosed to Player A the reciprocation rate of Republican Players B in the corresponding main treatment. We found that, regardless of the identity of Player B, revealing actual reciprocation rates made Democrats slightly more optimistic about Player B's trustworthiness, but it did not have a signi…cant e¤ect on Republicans'beliefs. Trust behavior, however, remained largely unchanged.
Our paper relates to the large literature on the drivers of trust in general and trust across partisan identity in particular. While providing a thorough account of this literature goes beyond the scope of this paper, it can be useful to sketch a brief note, primarily focused on the drivers of trust. Early experimental studies have provided evidence that a non-negligible proportion of senders do actually trust, and receivers usually reciprocate (Camerer and 3 Chen and Li (2009) …nd that individuals favor induced (according to taste and randomly) in-group members in trust games. Their evidence is consistent with individuals being more altruistic towards an in-group match. When it comes to identity based on pre-determined characteristics, Garbarino and Slonim (2009) show that expectations about partners'trustworthiness drives trust in experiments focused on the e¤ect of gender and age on trust behavior. Similarly, Falk, and Zehnder (2013) explore trust decisions conditional on the district of the receiver. They also …nd that in-group trust is in part driven by positive beliefs about in-group trustworthiness. 3 Other important studies have found that elements of psychological game theory (e.g., Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti 1989 and Rabin 1993) also explain trust behavior. Charness and Duwfenberg (2006) , for example, …nd that preferences over beliefs explain trust and trustworthy behavior. In the same vein, Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) introduce the concept of betrayal aversion to explain why individuals are less optimistic about return rates when matched to a human than when matched to a person. Under the assumption that some receivers reciprocate trust, Eckel and Wilson (2004) study whether there is a relationship between risk aversion and trust. The authors conclude there is no relationship unless additional control variables are included; but even in this case, the relationship is weak, at best. A similar conclusion is reached by Houser, Schunk, and Winter (2010).
They also …nd evidence that senders di¤erentiate their investments depending on the receiver's district (favoring senders living in high-income districts). Along the same lines, but instead varying ethnic a¢ liation to Israeli Jewish society, Ferschtman and Gneezy (2001) …nd systematic mistrust towards men of Eastern origin to be driven by mistaken stereotypes and not by a "taste for discrimination."
To our knowledge, there are two papers that experimentally link trust and partisan identity in the U.S. Both papers use a design similar to Berg et al. (1995) and employ undergraduate students as participants. Carlin and Love (2013) …nd higher levels of trust among individuals from the same partisan identity. Anderson, Mellor, and Milyo (2005) …nd that self-described liberals trust more often than self-described conservatives. These papers focus on trust rates and on reciprocation rates. They also use small stakes in their experiments. While small stakes seem suitable to motivate the student subjects in their studies, they may induce self-selection in surveys directed towards the general U.S. public.
Our contribution to this literature is threefold. First, we explore the mechanism that drives trust (beliefs over other-regarding concerns) according to political identity. Second, these studies use college students while our population consists of individuals living in the U.S. ranging from 18 to 82 years old. Third, the stakes in the present experiment are high considering the duration of the experiment and the incentives we use (i.e., average payo¤s were equivalent to $400 per hour).
Experimental Design
The main experiment ("main treatments") was designed to examine how trust behavior changes when we manipulate partners' partisan identity. We describe the main treatments in this section. The secondary experiment ("belief treatments") was run after the main experiment and it is described in section 6. Both of them used the Kellogg School of Management E-lab system, which maintains a pool of 7,045 participants from across the United States. E-lab sta¤ prescreens individuals in this subject pool through a survey instrument from which partisan identity and other demographic information are collected. We used this information regarding partisan identity to determine who received the experimental survey (the details are provided below). Subjects in this pool are then provided an opportunity to periodically participate in research surveys sponsored by faculty.
To maximize the response rate, our experimental survey was highly incentivized based on individual decisions. (Response rate: 97%, 485 out of 500 individuals.)
The questions were asked in order and once participants moved on to the next one, they were not able to go back to the previous question. Individuals did not receive any feedback regarding the results of their and their partner's decisions while they were answering the experimental survey. The procedure involved individual decision making, as in any other survey; the only di¤erence was that they were told that their decision on each question will be matched to the decision of a matched partner to compute payo¤s. The exact procedure was as follows.
Each potential participant received an invitation to participate in the experimental survey. 4 Balancing parsimony and the need to identify both trust behavior and beliefs about partners'trustworthiness, the survey consisted of 8 questions: the …rst 4 were incentivized and the last 4 were not. From the incentivized questions, the …rst one was a standard dictator game, where subjects were told to allocate $5 anonymously between themselves and another participant.
The second question corresponded to the sender role in a trust game similar to that in Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) in Figure 1 . Participants had a choice of trusting or not trusting a trustee (Player B), who would then make a …nal allocation decision. If the sender (Player A) decided not to trust, each participant received $5. If Player A decided to trust Player B, the decision left payo¤s as a function of Player B's choice. Our …rst intervention took place in this second question. 5 We varied the identity of Player B by letting Player A know that the otherwise-anonymous Player 4 The survey was administered via Qualtrics. A copy of the survey instrument can be found in the appendix. 5 We did not mention political a¢ liation to subjects until after the dictator game decision so as to obtain a measure of the Democrats'and Republicans'unconditional altruism and to avoid cueing on the subsequent trusting decision. B identi…ed him or herself as a Democrat or a Republican. 6 We also ran a baseline treatment where there was no such mention of the political identity of the subject's partner.
The third question asked the participant to make an allocation choice if entrusted with that decision by Player A. Following Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) , the participant, now in the role of Player B, had to decide whether to allocate $10 to each player or to behave opportunistically and take $14 for him or herself and provide $0 for Player A. In this question, we also varied the identity of Player A to be Democrat or Republican. 7 We also ran a baseline treatment where Player A's political identity was not revealed. Crucial to our analysis is the fourth question in which we elicited the participant's belief about what proportion of those in the role of Player B (in the previous question) would prove to be trustworthy. A payment of $3 was awarded if the participant predicted the sample's actual trustworthiness rate decile of Player B (i.e., those who would choose the ($10,$10) option when given the role of Player B). As in the previous two questions, we varied the information regarding the identity of those in the role of Player B by whether they identi…ed themselves as Democrat or Republican in the prescreen survey. 8 Consistent with the other questions, we also ran a no-identity baseline treatment. Each participant received only one type of survey instrument: that is, we …xed the identity of the partner across questions. For example, when a participant was told in the second question she will be matched with a Democrat Player B, in the third question she was told she will be matched with a Democrat Player A, and in the fourth question she had to state her beliefs about the proportion of Democrats in the role of Player B who would prove to be trustworthy. We followed the same pattern when the partner was a Republican and when his or her identity was not revealed. In this sense, we used the so-called "strategy method" to elicit behavior: participants made decisions individually, and those decisions were matched across subjects after everyone responded to the survey to compute payo¤s.
It is important to note that the outcomes of Player A's and Player B's decisions were paid in full. Hence, to the best of our knowledge, this is the …rst widely administered and highly incentivized experimental survey incorporating partisan identity.
The next four nonincentivized questions presented the Cognitive Re ‡ection Test from Frederick (2005) and asked for political orientation (from very liberal to very conservative), income range, and partisan identity (Republican, Democrat, Independent, or Other). Except for the Cognitive Re ‡ection Test, these demographic questions used the exact same language as in E-lab's prescreen survey. 8 Question Q4 in the Appendix "Survey instrument, treatment conditions: Revealing a partner's political identitya" 9 We use the information in the last four questions to control for intelligence and check for consistency with the E-lab prescreen survey. We …nd that subjects' answers to our questions are consistent with those given the E-lab, sometimes many months earlier. In particular, 221 out of 247 Democrats declared they were Democrat in the partisan question in our survey. Of the 26 remaining, 14 declared themselves Republican, 9 Independent, and 3 Other. In the case of Republicans, 182 out of 238 declared they were Republican in our survey. Of the 56 remaining, 39 declared themselves Democrat, 16 Independent and 1 Other. We …nd evidence, however, that declaring a di¤erent partisan identity may be driven by previous behavior and the partisan identity Partner's ideology: We used the partisan identity information from E-lab's prescreen survey to identify participants. E-lab sent the experimental survey to 250 Democrats and 250 Republicans in total. The baseline treatment survey (no partner's identi…cation) was sent to 100 out of the 250 Democrats, the survey type identifying the partner as a Democrat was sent to 100 of the remaining 150 Democrats, and the survey type identifying the partner as Republican was sent to the remaining 50 Democrats. The response rate was 100/100, 100/100, and 47/50, respectively. An analogous procedure was conducted with the 250 identi…ed Republicans. The baseline was sent to 100, the type of survey identifying a partner as a Republican was sent to 100 of the 150 remaining, and the type identifying the partner as a Democrat was sent to the remaining 50. The response rates were 95/100, 99/100, and 44/50, respectively. In total, we had 485 participants. No subject was allowed to answer more than one incentivized survey. Table 1 shows the treatments.
After the surveys were completed, subjects were randomly matched so that payments could be calculated. The survey was highly incentivized, payments averaged $20 per participant, and it took on average less than three minutes to complete the survey. Payments were made via electronic Amazon gift cards within approximately a week of completing the experiment. Subjects were only allowed to participate in one treatment (i.e., only complete one experimental survey).
We now turn to our theoretical framework.
of the partner. We discuss this possibility in the Appendix.
Theoretical framework and hypotheses
In this section we describe a simple model that incorporates beliefs and otherregarding preferences into the decision to trust. 
where, (I) is the weight on other's payo¤, I = s(ame); o(ther) denotes the identity of the receiver, and A and B represent monetary payo¤s. Equation (1) captures Gneezy and Fershtman's (2001) "taste for discrimination" as it represents, through (I); the extent to which individuals from a group are willing to give away money in order to bene…t others. Hence, (I) < 0 represents Player A loathing or disliking Player B, in our setting.
The decision to trust is inherently strategic, as it also depends on the beliefs about a partner's trustworthiness. Player A may decide to trust Player B even if she loathes him provided she is optimistic enough that Player B will honor trust. These beliefs re ‡ect the perception about the behavior of others, and they may have little to do with own feelings about people from the same or di¤erent group. As Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) point out, the perception about others'behavior may come from stereotypes that may or may not be accurate. Speci…cally, Player A's decision to trust responds to her expected net bene…t (Williamson's (1993) "calculative trust"), which in turn depends on her sentiments towards others, (I); and the beliefs about the other player's trustworthiness, p: Assuming risk neutrality, and assuming preferences are as in equation (1), the utility of not trusting is equal to 5 and the expected utility of trusting is p10+(1 p) (I)14. Assuming also that there are other random elements that determine the decision to trust or not to trust, which we denote as " T and " N T respectively, Player A will trust if and only if
Let F be a cumulative distribution function of " N T " T then the probability that we observe trust is given by
Note from equation (2) that the probability Player A trusts Player B conditional on p is weakly increasing in (I): Current theories describe polarization in the American society as being rooted in loathe and dislike (see, e.g., Iyengar 2012). As Carlin and Love (2014) discuss, this antagonism may be rooted in perceiving co-partisans as friends and members of the other party as foes when political competition is …erce. All this can be represented as a(s) > (o): an individual bene…ts more from the other's payo¤s when they share the same political identity. If this is the case, then Player A is more likely to trust a co-partisan than an opponent.
Claim 1 Conditional on the beliefs about the receiver's (Player B) trustworthiness, sender (Player A) trust rates are higher when the receiver has the same political identity than when she has a di¤erent political identity.
Trust behavior, however, can also emerge in the extreme case of negative otherregarding concerns between members of di¤erent groups. In equation (2), for example, even if we let (o) 0, more optimistic beliefs will make trust more likely. 10 More generally, for any …xed (I) below 5/7, the probability Player A trusts Player B is increasing in p:
Claim 2 The sender (Player A) propensity to trust is increasing in her beliefs about the receiver (Player B) trustworthiness.
According to Akerlof and Kranton (2005, p. 12) the views as to how people should behave depend upon the situation and, in particular, between whom a transaction takes place. Republicans, for example, appealing to in-group loyalty (one of the "moral foundations" in Graham, Haidt, and Nosek (2009) by which conservatives abide) may reciprocate trust more often to fellow Republican than to Democrat Players A. Along the same lines, Democrats may believe Republicans' reciprocate less often than fellow Democrats, as Democrats show greater endorsement to the fairness/reciprocity "moral foundation" in Graham et al. (2009) . In general, scholars have argued that political polarization in terms of partisan identity has caused people to be biased (favoring their own group) in their assessment of relative group merits (see, e.g., Oten and Wentura 1999, Mason 2014). The broader point is that beliefs about trustworthiness depend on Player B's partisan identity and on whether Player B's identity matches that of Player A. In our model, we represent this as p = p(I).
Our third hypothesis is therefore p(s) > p(o).
Claim 3 Participants believe individuals with the same partisan identity are more likely to be trustworthy than individuals with di¤erent partisan identity.
These stereotypes, however, may or may not re ‡ect actual behavior. Using equation (1), and comparing the utility of reciprocating, u B (10; 10) = 10 + R ; with the utility of not reciprocating, u B (14; 0) = [1 (I)]14 + N R , the probability that Player B reciprocates is given by
where G is the cumulative distribution function of N R R . In this case, Player B honors trust more often when Player A identi…es herself with the same party, i.e.
a(s) > (o):
Claim 4 Receiver's (Player B) rates of reciprocation are higher with co-partisan senders (Player A) than with others.
In other words, beliefs about trustworthiness should be statistically correct. We test these hypotheses in the next two sections. We …rst describe a reduced form model and then a simple structural model, based on social preferences as in Charness and Rabin (2002) and identity as in Chen and Li (2009 
Results
Consistent with previous studies (see, e.g., Pew Research Center 2012), Republicans and Democrats have di¤erent demographic characteristics in our sample. Table 2 shows the means of the most relevant ones in our study. It is important to note that although Republicans and Democrats are di¤erent in many respects, they keep almost the same amount in the dictator game (US$ 3.72 and US$ 3.67 out of US$ 5, respectively). Regarding demographics, in our sample we observe a greater proportion of individuals who are male, white, conservative (and very conservative), or married with annual earnings between US$ 75k and US$ 150k among Republicans compared with Democrats. We observe no signi…cant di¤erences across partisanship in the proportion of black individuals, those who have at least a college education, those who are currently not working, or those who earn between US$ 150k and US$ 250k a year. These di¤erences are consistent with those found in Pew Research Center (2012). Before we run the reduced form and structural models, we describe the overall results directly from the data in Table 3 . Trust and beliefs about partners'trustworthiness are relatively high and fairly similar across political identities of Player A. Democrats trust 56% of the time and believe Player B will reciprocate 62% of the time. The same …gures for Republicans are 60% and 63%, respectively (see column "Overall" in Table 3 ). The di¤erences in trust rates are not statistically signi…cant (chi-squared p-value = 0.4). The di¤erences in beliefs are also not statistically different across partisan identities of Player A (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution p-value = 1.0). When we analyze Player A's behavior according to the partisan identity of Player B in Table 3 , Democrats trust Democrats more often than they do Republicans: 63% of the time, compared with 40% of the time (chi-squared p-value < 0.01). Relative to an anonymous Player B, Democrats trust other Democrats more (63% versus 57%, chi-squared p-value = 0.4) and trust a Republican Player B less (40% versus 57%, chi-squared p-value = 0.05), although only the latter di¤erence is statistically signi…cant at conventional levels. Regarding beliefs, a Democrat Player A believes a Democrat Player B is more trustworthy on average: the mean expected frequency of reciprocal behavior is 67% when Player B is a Democrat compared with 52% when Player B is Republican. The distributions of beliefs are statistically di¤erent at conventional levels (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test p-value < 0.01). When compared with an anonymous Player B, the mean belief about Player B's trustworthiness is 62%. The di¤erence between the distributions of beliefs about a Democrat and an anonymous Player B is not statistically signi…cant at conventional levels (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test p-value = 0.6), but this di¤erence is signi…cant when we compare a Republican and an anonymous Player B (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test p-value = 0.02).
Perhaps surprisingly, Republicans trust a Democrat Player B more often (66% of the time) than a Republican Player B (58% of the time), although the di¤erence is not statistically signi…cant at conventional levels (chi-squared p-value = 0.3). Nor are there any statistical di¤erences in trust for Republicans across other pair-wise comparisons.
In sum, we …nd that partisan identity has an e¤ect only for Democrat Players A: they believe that other Democrats are more trustworthy, and they act consistently with this belief by more often trusting fellow Democrats. Note that this analysis of the raw data allows us to test Claim 3, which is supported by the data only for Democrats. To test Claim 1 (conditional on beliefs, Player B's partisan identity determines trust through other-regarding preferences) we need to …x beliefs to determine whether trust rates vary across Player B's identities. To test Claim 2 (the propensity to trust depends on Player A's beliefs about Player B's trustworthiness), we estimate a probability model of trust as a function of Player A's beliefs.
In the next section we …rst …t a reduced form model to determine whether the propensity to trust responds to beliefs-providing a test for Claim 2. Then we test Claim 1 by estimating a structural model to explore whether it is beliefs or preferences that explain these trust rates.
Empirical models
Player A's trust toward Player B may re ‡ect other-regarding preferences or beliefs about Player B's trustworthiness in both cases-although identity has a signi…cant e¤ect only on Democrats. Is trust explained only by beliefs about Player B's trustworthiness? Or is it the case that when beliefs are …xed, identity determines Player A's trust through sentiments represented by preferences favoring co-partisans? In the following two subsections we provide evidence that contradicts Claim 1 (i.e., we …nd that partisan identity does not matter once beliefs are controlled for) and lends support to Claim 2 (i.e., we …nd that trust rates are increasing in Player A's beliefs about Player B's trustworthiness).
Reduced-form model
To analyze the impact of identity on the probability of trust, we estimate the following baseline reduced-form empirical model:
The subscript i indexes individuals. I i s and I i o denote whether the political identity of Player B is either the same as (s) or other than (o) that of Player A (the baseline corresponds to the cases in which the partisan identity of Player B is not revealed to Player A). p i represents the beliefs about Player B's trustworthiness, and X i denotes demographic controls. We estimate this model for the overall sample, only for Democrat Player A, and only for Republican Player A. For each of these, we report regressions using a linear probability model without controlling for p i and without controls, a linear probability model controlling for p i and without controls, and a linear probability model controlling for p i and using demographic controls. Table 4 columns (1)- (3) show the results for the overall sample, columns (4)-(6) the results for Democrat Player A, and columns (7)- (9) Table 3 for Democrat Players A). This result, however, confounds the impact of identity through beliefs. In short, when controlling for beliefs, the coe¢ cient of identity is no longer signi…cant regardless of Player A's partisan identity.
Moreover, Player A's beliefs about Player B's trustworthiness are highly signi…-cant for all the speci…cations. Columns (2) and (3) in Table 4 show that a change in one standard deviation in beliefs (23%) makes it 10% more likely that Player A trusts Player B. The large share of this e¤ect is explained by Democrat Players A. On the one hand, when looking at the coe¢ cient of beliefs only for Democrat Players A, an increase in one standard deviation in beliefs yields a 12% increase in the likelihood of Player A trusting Player B, according to this model. The corresponding e¤ect for Republican Players A is roughly 9%.
These results give no support to Claim 1, as Player B's partisan identity does not have an e¤ect on Player A's trust rates when beliefs are controlled for. Claim 2, however, is borne out by the data: Player A's propensity to trust is increasing in her beliefs about Player B's trustworthiness. This e¤ect is more pronounced for Democrat Players A.
In the next section, we exploit the preferences speci…cations used in Charness and Rabin (2002) (3), (6), and (9) demographic controls were considered. The …rst three columns pool all the observations, the second three columns consider only Democrat Player A, and the last three consider only Republican Player A.
Structural model
In this section we are more speci…c about how we model sentiments by representing preferences using the Charness and Rabin (2002) 
where h = 1 if B > A and h = 0 otherwise; l = 1 if B < A and l = 0 otherwise; and ; are parameters to be estimated. Following Chen and Li (2009) we incorporate group identity by setting
where I s = 1 if Player A and Player B share the same partisan identity and zero otherwise, and I o = 1 if they hold di¤erent partisan identities and zero otherwise. The parameters q and w (respectively q and w) represent the utility bene…t Player A receives for trusting a Player B who shares the same (respectively di¤erent) partisan ideology. Replacing equation (3) with equation (2) yields to
where 0 = (14 5); 1 = (10 14 ); 2 = 14 w; 3 = 14 w; 4 = 14 w; and 5 = 14 w: Claim 1 states that if trusting decisions are rooted on dislike or loathe, i.e., partisan identity matters through preferences, then for given beliefs about Player B's trustworthiness, p; the probability Player A trusts a co-partisan Player B (I s = 1) should be larger than the probability Player A trusts a Player B with di¤erent a partisan ideology (I o = 1). Hence, using this model, Claim 1 can be stated as
We estimate these probabilities using a linear model without controls. 12 Figure 2 shows the di¤erence in (4) Figure 3 : This …gure shows the predicted probability Player A (sender) trusts a Player B (receiver) from the same partisan identity (green line) and from a di¤erent partisan identity (blue line) for di¤erent values of p. The standard errors used to compute the con…dence intervals represented by the vertical segments were calculated using the Delta method.
In order to test Claim 2, we plot each one of the terms on the left-hand side of (4) in Figure 3 estimated for the full sample. Both are increasing in p: Moreover, the marginal e¤ect of p in the …rst term (when matched with a same-partisan-ideology Player B, I s = 1), F ( 0 + 2 + ( 1 + 4 )p), is 68% (t-test p-value < 0.01) and the marginal e¤ect of p in the second term (when matched with a di¤erent-partisanideology Player B, I o = 1), F ( 0 + 3 + ( 1 + 5 )p); is 33% (t-test p-value = 0.09). These results support Claim 2, as in the previous subsection.
In sum, the results from reduced-form and structural models suggest that trust behavior is driven by beliefs of trustworthiness rather than by a¢ nity or dislike for a particular member's partisan identity.
Beliefs are driving trust in our setting. Do Player A's beliefs depend on the partisan identity of Player B? Before we move on to testing Claim 4 (whether beliefs are statistically correct), we answer this question in the next section.
Beliefs and Identity
In this section we ask whether partisan identity has an e¤ect on out-of-group beliefs about a partner's trustworthiness, that is, whether in-group and out-of-group stereotypes determine trust. Table 5 shows several variations of the baseline empirical model:
The subscript i indexes individuals. p i represents the beliefs about Player B's trustworthiness, I i s and I i o denote whether the political identity of Player B is either the same as (s) or other than (o) that of Player A (the baseline corresponds to the case when individuals do not know the identity of the partner), and X i denotes demographic controls. We estimate this model for the overall sample, only for Democrat Player A (sender), and only for Republican Player A. For each of these subsamples, we report regressions using a linear probability model without demographic controls and a linear probability model using demographic controls. The controls included are Amount Kept in Dictator Game, Gender, Cohort, Ethnicity, Marital Status, English Writing Skills, Language at Home, Time Living in the U.S., Citizenship, Full-Time School, Educational Attainment, Employment Status, Income Range, Size of Household, Minors at Home, and Political Orientation (from very liberal to very conservative). Table 5 columns (1) and (2) show the results for the overall sample, columns (3) and (4) the results for Democrat Player A, and columns (5) and (6) (1) and (2) show the results for the overall sample (with and without demographic controls, respectively), columns (3) and (4) the results for democrat Player A (with and without demographic controls, respectively), and columns (5) and (6) the results for Republican Player A (with and without demographic controls, respectively).
di¤erent. This result, however, is driven by Democrat Players A. Democrats are 11-12% (t-test p-value < 0.01) less likely to trust a Republican, when compared to a Player B whose partisan identity is unknown or whose partisan identity is also Democrat. For the Republicans in our sample, partisan identity does not seem to a¤ect beliefs. These results show that Democrats perceive Republicans as less trustworthy than Democrats, and that Republicans'perceptions about Player B's trustworthiness do not depend on Player B's partisan identity. Are these perceptions statistically correct? In the next section we explore this question in order to test Claim 4.
Beliefs and actual trustworthiness
We have provided tests for Claims 1, 2, and 3. In this section, we proceed to test Claim 4. In general, Table 6 shows that beliefs about a partner's trustworthiness are not statistically correct-they are more pessimistic. Overall, Democrat Players [10, 10] . The "Overall" column shows the average beliefs for all Democrats and Republican Players A and the rate of reciprocation overall in the sample.
A believe on average that 62% of Players B will reciprocate, but 80% end up doing so. Not all, of course, are excessively pessimistic: 53 out of 247 Democrat Players A state that at least 80% of Players B will reciprocate. Similarly, Republican Players A believe on average that 63% of Players B will cooperate. Sixty out of 238 Republican Players A state that at least 80% of Players B will reciprocate. These di¤erences are more pronounced when we separate them by the partisan identity of Player B. Republican Players B reciprocate trust to a Democrat Player A 93% of the time, which is notably higher than the mean belief a Democrat Player A holds about a Republican Player B: 52%. Only 8% (4 out of 47) of Democrat Players A were correct in their guesses: these 4 Democrats believed at least 90% of Republican Players B would reciprocate trust. The di¤erence is less pronounced when Player B is Democrat and Player A is Republican: mean beliefs are 63% and the actual reciprocation rate is 81%. Twenty-…ve percent (11 out of 44) of Republican Players A believed at least 80% of Democrat Players B would reciprocate trust.
As we saw in the previous section, Player B's partisan identity has a statistically signi…cant e¤ect on beliefs (see Table 5 and the columns in Table 6 ) only for Democrat Players A. In this case, the actual reciprocation rate by Democrats is 85% (85 out of 100) compared with 93% (41 out of 44) by Republican Players B. Although this di¤erence is not statistically signi…cant (chi-squared p-value = 0.17), if anything, it points in the other direction: Republicans are more trustworthy than Democrats, when matched with a Democrat Player A (sender). In contrast, Republicans do not show a statistically di¤erent perception about Player B's trustworthiness across partisan identity (mean beliefs are 63% when matched with a Democrat Player B versus 62% when matched with a Republican Player B), and there is also no signi…cant di¤erences in terms of actual behavior: 81% versus 87%, chi-squared p-value =0.34. Although not statistically signi…cant, Republican Players B tend to reciprocate more often than Democrat Players B when matched with a Republican Player A.
Overall, Player A's beliefs about Player B's trustworthiness are lower than actual reciprocation rates. For Democrat Players A, beliefs turn out to be incorrect, which does not support Claim 4. For Republican Players A, there is no statistical di¤er-ence in Player B reciprocation rates between Democrats and Republicans, which is consistent with Republican Player A's beliefs. In total, these results do not support Claim 4.
In the next section we explore the role of identity in the trustworthy behavior.
Trustworthy behavior and preferences
The decision to reciprocate does not hinge on beliefs. A further test on whether preferences, on top of beliefs, play a role is to explore the e¤ect of partisan identity on the decision to reciprocate. Table 7 reports results for the following linear probability model:
The subscript i indexes individuals. I i s and I i o denote whether the political identity of Player B is either the same (s) as or other than (o) that of Player A (the baseline corresponds to the case in which the partisan identity of Player B is not revealed to Player A). X i denotes the usual demographic controls. Overall, a Wald test fails to reject the hypothesis that the coe¢ cients for the dummy variables (I s ) and (I o ) are di¤erent from one another. That is, the decision to reciprocate does not signi…cantly depend on the partisan identity of the sender when this identity is known. It is worth noting that only Republican Players B tend to reciprocate trust significantly more often when Player A's partisan identity is revealed than when it is not. This e¤ect diminishes when we incorporate demographic controls into the estimation. This suggests that some of the preferences for reciprocation may be driven by subpopulations that may condition their behavior when interacting with individuals from known and unknown partisan identities. Thus, in the next section we explore the di¤erences in trust and trustworthiness for each demographic characteristic when we vary the identity of the matched partner.
Manipulating beliefs
Given the importance of beliefs in trust behavior, we further explore whether pessimistic and incorrect beliefs can be manipulated. We run four additional experimen-tal surveys in which we reveal the rate of reciprocation by Players B from the main treatments. No other change is introduced to the format or content of the survey relative to the survey in the main treatments. 13 The four experimental surveys in this "beliefs treatment" were sent to a total of 200 participants: 100 Democrats and 100 Republicans. Out of the 100 Democrats, 50 received the survey that revealed the identity of the matching partner to be Democrat and the proportion of Democrat Players B who reciprocated trust in the main treatments to be 85%. The remaining 50 Democrats received the survey that stated the partner was a Republican and Republican Players B reciprocated 91% of the time in past surveys. Similarly, each of the 50 (out of 100) Republicans who received the experimental survey was matched to a Democrat and was informed Democrats reciprocated trust 79% of the time when they were matched with a Republican Player A. Each of the 50 remaining Republicans was matched to a Republican and was informed that Republicans reciprocated trust 88% of the time when matched with another Republican. The response rate was 46/50 for a Democrat Player A matched with a Democrat Player B, 48/50 for a Democrat Player A matched with a Republican Player B, 47/50 for a Republican Player A matched with a Democrat Player B, and 50/50 for a Republican Player A matched with a Republican Player B. 13 The only variation in Q3 with respect to the main treatments is the information about reciprocation rates. The question reads as follows: "You will receive a payment based on your decision in the following scenario: You will be matched to another survey participant who considered him or herself to be a [DEMOCRAT/REPUBLICAN]. You need to decide between the following two options: 1) You and the other participant each receive $5 OR You let the other participant choose. He/she will decide between one of two options: i) You receive $0 and he/she receives $14 or ii) Each of you receives $10.
In previous surveys, when the other Democrat participant was designated to choose, he/she chose alternative ii) "Each of you receives $10" X% of the time. Please enter your decision:
I choose option 1) (1) I choose option 2) (2)"
E¤ect of revealing previous reciprocation rates on beliefs about trustworthiness
Does revealing actual reciprocation rates change beliefs? Figure 4 shows the distribution of beliefs declared by Democrats for the baseline condition in which no information about actual reciprocation rates is revealed and the treatment condition in which participants are informed about this. test p-value < 0.05).
From these results we can conclude that revealing previous cooperation rates has a positive e¤ect on beliefs about Player B's trustworthiness only when Player A is Democrat. When Player B is Republican, on the other hand, revealing information has no, or even a negative, e¤ect on beliefs. In particular, revealing information about actual reciprocation rates changes little the beliefs about the other party's members'trustworthiness. This results are consistent with the evidence presented in Friesen, Campbell, and Kay (2014 
E¤ect of revealing previous reciprocation rates on trust
We have seen beliefs positively change only for Democrats. Does this increase trust behavior? Focusing …rst on Democrat Players A, revealing reciprocation rates induces higher trust in Democrat Players B, from 63% (63 out of 100) to 76% (35 out of 46), although the di¤erence is not statistically signi…cant at conventional levels (chi-squared test p-value = 0.12). Revealing actual reciprocation rates does not affect trust when Player B is Republican. Trust rates go from 40% (19 out of 47) to 35% (17 out of 48, chi-squared p-value = 0.62).
For Republican Players A who face Democrat Players B, even though trust rates decrease across treatments, they are not statistically di¤erent (66%, 29 out of 100 in the main treatment; and 51%, 24 out of 47, in the beliefs treatment, chi-squared test p-value = 0.15). Finally, for Republican Players A facing Republican Players B, the trust rate decrease by a signi…cant amount: 58% (57 out of 99) in the main treatment to 16% (8 out of 50) in the beliefs treatment (chi-squared test p-value < 0.01). Table 8 summarizes these results.
Trust does not seem to respond to the revelation of the actual reciprocation rates in previous games. We expected that, at least for Democrat Players A, trust rates would increase when reciprocation rates are revealed. We conclude from this exercise that manipulating incorrect beliefs by revealing the true state of the world is not easy. Thus, beliefs about reciprocity across partisanship may not be very malleable.
Conclusion
Political polarization is an important phenomenon that motivates many recent popular and academic articles in economics (see, e.g., Fisman, Jakiela, and Kariv 2014). The emergence of polarization is often explained as being driven by those with different political identities having dislike or even hatred for one other. We, however, o¤er another possibility: people have di¤erent beliefs about how trustworthy people of di¤erent ideologies are.
To explore both of these possibilities, we explicitly studied the relationship between political ideology and trust among a representative US population. In particular, we had paired subjects play a simple trust game with either the same or opposite political identity partner. We found that there are partisan identity-based di¤erences in trusting rates. Whereas Republicans do not exhibit di¤erent trust rates between partners of di¤erent partisan identities, Democrats trust partners of their own partisan identity more than Republicans. The mechanism that explains this di¤erence seems to be driven by beliefs about partner trustworthiness and not by a taste for discrimination based on partisan identity. The source of trusting behavior is important-whether it comes primarily from beliefs or taste-not only because trust is de…ned in terms of beliefs, but also because beliefs re ‡ect stereotypes, whereas preferences re ‡ect individual taste for discrimination. We also found that although there was no di¤erence in trustworthiness as a function of partisan identity, overall, individuals held beliefs that were much more pessimistic than actual trustworthiness, regardless of the partisan identity of both the trustee and trustor.
It is encouraging that polarization is more likely driven by incorrect beliefs than distaste for others: It seems that it would be easier to change incorrect beliefs than taste-based preferences. However, these incorrect beliefs are apparently not easy to change; we were only able to modestly nudge beliefs towards reality. We leave this challenge to future research: discovering the most e¤ective means by which to correct beliefs. Both theory-building and empirical analysis on this issue should prove helpful.
We also note that we only explored the two primary political ideologies in the United States. It would be interesting to explore additional ideologies, as well as those in di¤erent countries. We leave this exploration to future research. * For the following questions, you will be paid in Amazon gift certi…cates according to how you choose to answer them. Q1 You will receive a payment according to your decision in the following scenario: You have a total of $5 to divide between yourself and another survey participant in any way you want (in increments of $1).
______ Decide how many dollars you hold (1) ______ Decide how many dollars you pass (2) Q2 You will receive a payment based on your decision in the following scenario: You will be matched to another survey participant. You need to decide between the following two options: 1) You and the other participant each receive $5 2) You let the other participant choose. He/she will decide between one of two options: i) You receive $0 and he/she receives $14 or ii) Each of you receives $10. Please enter your decision:
I choose option 1) (1) I choose option 2) (2) Q3 You will receive a payment based on your decision in the following scenario: You will be matched to another survey participant. The other participant can choose for each of you to receive $5 or instead he/she can let you decide between one of two options: 1) You and the other participant each receive $10 2) You receive $14 and the other participant receives $0 In case the other participant lets you choose, please enter your decision:
I choose option 1) (1) I choose option 2) (2) Q4 You will receive an additional $3 if you guess the correct percentage range of participants that choose option 1) for the above question: Between: 0 and 9% (1) 10 and 19% (2) 20 and 29% (3) 30 and 39% (4) 40 and 49% (5) 50 and 59% (6) 60 and 69% (7) 70 and 79% (8) 80 and 89% (9) 90 and 100% (10) Q5 Please answer the following questions: A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? (1) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets? (2) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? (5) 50 and 59% (6) 60 and 69% (7) 70 and 79% (8) 80 and 89% (9) 90 and 100% (10) Q5 Please answer the following questions: A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? (1) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets? (2) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? (3) Q6 What is your political orientation? Very Liberal (1) Liberal (2) Moderate ( One important concern that arises is whether declaring di¤erent partisan identity is in part caused by their previous behavior and the partisan identity of the partner. For example, Republicans may want to deliver a statement that even Democrats trust Republicans. Our data is consistent with this: 16 of the 39 Republicans who switched to Democrats after the experiment were matched with Republicans. 81% of them (13 out of 16) trusted a Republican Player B, which is signi…cantly larger than the 53% of the 77 who did not switch to Democrat (41 out of 77, chi-squared p-value = 0.039).
14 Another reason for the switch may be to feign partisanship when the participant did not trust. Consistent with this, we observe Republicans who switched to Democrat and were matched with an anonymous Player B (17 out of 95) trusted the anonymous partner signi…cantly less often than those who did not switch (72 out of 95): 35% compared to 61%, chi-squared p-value = 0.054. 15 This seemingly strategic behavior is not particular to Republicans. Democrats may also feign partisan identity to make Republicans "look bad." Democrats who were matched with a Republican, for example, who switched to Republican (4 out of 47) never trusted a Republican Player B, while those who did not switch (40 out of 47, the remaining 3 switched to either Independent or Other) did so 42% of the time. Although this di¤erence is marginally signi…cant at conventional levels (chi-squared p-value = 0.096), it suggests that individuals may be trying to feign partisan identity to undermine the other party's image.
